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ARE YOU BREAKING SOME SORT OF LAW?: PROTECTING
AN EMPLOYEE'S INFORMAL COMPLAINTS UNDER THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACTS ANTI-RETALIATION
PROVISION
Discharges resulting from an employee's complaint about an
employer's statutory violation are all too common. Recent statistics
indicate that retaliation charges filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased from 11,096 in 1992 to
19,694 in 1999.1 Moreover, charges of retaliation now comprise over
twenty-five percent of the EEOC's workload.2 "The growth in the
number of retaliation claims is especiallyimpressive when compared
with the statistics for sex and race claims, because the number of
complaints for the latter has remained fairly constant over the last
few years."' As the number of retaliation charges continues to
increase, it becomes more important to understand the statutory
1. See Office of Research, Info., and Planning, Charge Statistics from the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission FY 1992 Through FY 1999 (last modified Jan. 12,
2000) <http-//www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html> [hereinafter Charge Statistics]. These
statistics include retaliation claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III
1997), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). See Charge Statistics,
supra. Although only the EPA claims reflect those charges filed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. IV 1997), the total
number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC provides a useful analogy to those filed
under the FLSA. Such a dramatic increase in retaliation charges arguably is not confined to
Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the EPA, but extends to the FLSA as well. See also
Teresa L. Butler & A. Michael Weber, Retaliation Lawsuits are Increasing Rapidly, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at B5 (stating that the number of retaliation charges filed has grown
significantly in recent years).
2. See Charge Statistics, supra note 1.
3. Marisa Williams & Rhonda Rhodes, Recent Developments in Retaliation Law and
Resulting Implications for the Federal Sector, 28-Jan. CoLO. LAW. 59, 59 (1999) ("While sex
and race discrimination claims still exceed the number of retaliation claims filed [in the
federal and private sector], retaliation claims have surpassed every other type of
discrimination claim ... ."); see also supra text accompanying note 1 (stating the statistics
for retaliation claims from 1992 to 1999).
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provisions governing retaliation so that they may be applied con-
sistently.
Consider the following story: From February of 1997 to May of
1998, Tessia Clevinger worked as a waitress for Motel Sleepers, Inc.
(Motel).4 Believing that she was not being paid fairly, Tessia
complained on two separate occasions to her manager, Sue Dotson,
about Motel's wage violations.5 Each time Tessia complained, Dotson
"chastised" her.6 Tessia then contacted the Department of Labor
(DOL) and made an inquiry regarding Motel's rate of pay.7 The DOL
told Tessia that the Fair Labor Standards Act8 (FLSA) entitled her
to receive the federal minimum wage for her work and that Motel
owed her the difference between the minimum wage and what she
had been paid.9 Armed with this information, Tessia informed
Motel's management that according to the DOL, Motel had violated
the law in refusing to pay her minimum wage."0 Motel's manage-
ment reprimanded Tessia and insisted that she was wrong.1 The
management continued to harass Tessia until Motel fired her in May
of 1998.12
Subsequent to her dismissal, Tessia brought a lawsuit against
Motel charging retaliation" in violation of section 215(a)(3) of the
FLSA."4 Tessia argued that she had been fired in retaliation for
4. See Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322 (W.D. Va. 1999).
5. See id. at 323.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
9. See Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Retaliation involves the discharge of, or discrimination against, an employee because
the employee engaged in a protected activity. An employee engages in a protected activity
when she: 1) opposes an unlawful employment practice; or 2) participates in the statutory
complaint process. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8 (1998). The anti-retaliation provision
of the FLSA provides a list of protected activities. It allows protection for those employees
who file complaints, institute proceedings or testify in proceedings. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
This Note addresses the degree of formality that is required to constitute a complaint that
is filed within the meaning of the provision.
14. See Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 323. Section 215(a)(3) states:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person ... to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such
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complaining to Motel's management and for contacting the DOL
regarding her wages. 5 In response, Motel argued that Tessia had
never filed a formal written complaint with the DOL and, as such,
her charge of retaliation could not be sustained. 6 The district court
held that the FLSA did not entitle Tessia to protection from retal-
iatory discharge because Tessia had not filed a lawsuit against the
company or a formal charge with the DOL before her dismissal. 7
Accordingly, Motel had the freedom to discharge Tessia for her
complaints of unlawful conduct. The district court's decision left
Tessia unemployed and without recourse.
Tessia Clevinger's plight highlights a vexing question that
currently splits the federal circuits, 8 namely, with what degree of
formality must an employee's complaint be filed in order to preserve
a later charge of retaliation against the employer under section
215(a)(3) of the FLSA? This Note addresses the meaning of the
phrase "has filed any complaint" 9 and argues that the correct con-
struction of the provision includes informal complaints made to
employers. The first section looks at the goals of the FLSA and the
importance of the anti-retaliation provision to achieving those goals.
It also includes a brief overview of the prima facie case of retaliation.
Section two presents the divergent approaches taken in construing
the language of section 215(a)(3). Courts on one side of the issue
argue that the plain language of the statute protects only those
employees who file a formal complaint with a court or government
agency.2 Other courts reject this approach, holding that the
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
15. See Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 324.
18. Compare Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
protection of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision extends to those employees who make
informal complaints to their employer), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000), with Lambert v.
Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the plain language of the FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision precludes protection unless an employee files a lawsuit or formal
complaint with a government agency).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
20. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55; Booze v. Shawmut, Conn. Bank,62 F. Supp. 2d 593,
598 (D. Conn. 1999); Johns v. Cianbro Corp., No. 3:98CV1831 (AHN), 1999 WL 200699, at
*2 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 1999); Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 324; ONeill v. Allendale Mut. Ins.
Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (E.D. Va. 1997); Acosta v. Yale Club, No. 94 CIV. 0888(KTD),
2000]
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provision encompasses protection for informal complaints.21 Section
three surveys and evaluates the competing arguments surrounding
this issue and argues that the statute should be construed broadly
to include informal complaints. After concluding that informal
complaints fall within the anti-retaliation provision, section four
examines the degree of informality permissible under the FLSA
and proposes a proper construction of the provision. The final section
presents a summary and concludes that the anti-retaliation provision
of the FLSA must allow employees to lodge informal complaints with
employers before the goals of the FLSA can be achieved.
1995 WL 600873, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1995).
21. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1007 ("The actions taken by the plaintiffs here... clearly
constitute the filing of a complaint.... [Tihe plaintiffs not only complained orally ... they
also contacted the Department of Labor... and notified their employer in writing."); Valerio
v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding written complaints sufficient
to fall within the statute); Cunninghamv. Gibson County, Tenn., Nos. 95-6665,95-6667,1997
WL 123750, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) ("[I]t is the assertion of statutory rights that is the
triggering factor, not the filing of a formal complaint"); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121
F.3d 1390,1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (protecting a plaintiffs assertion that he was owed overtime
wages); EEOC v. Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing
protection of an employee who complained that her employer was "'breaking some sort of
law'"); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding an
employee's oral complaints sufficient to fall under the statute); Brockv. Richardson, 812 F.2d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987) (protecting an employee where the employer was mistaken about the
employee's participation in protected activity); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383,
387(10th Cir. 1984) (applying the anti-retaliation provision where the employee senta memo
to the employer and attached a copy of the EPA); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d
179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975) (protecting an employee who refused to return a back wage check);
Wittenberg v. Wheels, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 654, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (allowing protection for
an employee who made oral complaints to her employer); Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc.,
No. Civ. 96-1542-AS, 1997 WL 907915, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997) ("[Section] 215(a)(3)
forbids retaliation against an employee for having asserted her rights under the statute,
regardless of whether the assertion of rights was in the form of a formal complaint to a
government agency or in a complaint made directly to her employer."); Stading v. DFC
Transp. Sys. Intl, Inc., No. 92 C 1801, 1993 WL 338987, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1993)
(protecting an employee's oral complaints); LeFebvre v. Rite-A-Way Indus., Inc., Civ. A- No.
91-1435-MLB, 1993 WL 245747, at *4 (D. Kan. June 14, 1993) (providing coverage to an
employee's conversation with the employer); Prewitt v. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F.
Supp. 560, 563-64 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (protecting an employee's call to the DOL); Daniel v.
Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (protecting an employee's
complaint to her employer and call to the DOL because her "actions promoted the FLSA's
purpose of protecting workers, and § 215(a)(3)'s goals of providing information to federal
officials and allowing an employee to assert her rights").
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND
RETALIATION LAW
The FLSA is a "remedial and humanitarian" statute,22 enacted
during the Great Depression and intended to achieve "certain
minimum labor standards" in those industries it covers.23 The FLSA
governs the payment of minimum wages 24 and overtime compensa-
tion.25 The FLSA was amended in 1963 to include the Equal Pay
Act (EPA),26 which forbids wage discrimination based on sex by
mandating equal pay for equal work. Congress saw compliance with
these provisions as a means of achieving the FLSA's main goal,
which was "to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate
[substandard conditions]."27
Rather than ensuring compliance with the FLSA through
government supervision of employers, Congress looked to employees
to report violations. 28 Employees will not do so, however, if they
believe their jobs will be jeopardized by making the report.2 9 This
fear may cause "employees quietly to accept substandard con-
ditions,"30 which defeats the FLSA's goal of eliminating such
conditions. Accordingly, the goals of the FLSA can be achieved only
if employees are protected from any retaliation that mayresult from
their complaints.3'
22. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 202; Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292
(1960).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 206.
25. See id. § 207.
26. See id. § 206(d).
27. Id. § 202(b). Substandard conditions were defined as those that were "detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers." Id. § 202(a).
28. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
29. See id.; see also EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8, 8-2 (1998) ("If retaliation... were
permitted to go unremedied, it would have a chilling effect upon the willingness of
individuals to speak out against employment discrimination... ."). Cf Dorothy E. Larkin,
Note, Participation Anxiety: Should Title VI's Participation Clause Protect Employees
Participating in Internal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV. 1181, 1204-05 (1999) (arguing that
employees are less likely to bring Title VII suits if they fear retaliation).
30. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
31. See id. ("[Elffective enforcement could.., only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances.").
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The FLSA specifically provides protection from retaliation in
section 215(a)(3):
[It shall be unlawful for any person... to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceedingunder or related to this chapter, or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has
served or is about to serve on an industry committee.3 2
Congress intended this provision to increase compliance with the
labor standards established by the FLSA,33 such as the minimum
wage' and overtime regulations. 5
In a charge of retaliation, the employee holds the burden of
establishing a prima facie case by proving that: 1) the employee
engaged in an activity protected under the statute of which the
employer was aware; 2) the employee was subject to adverse action
by her employer; and 3) there is a causal relationship between the
protected activity and the adverse action. 6 Once the employee
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the
employer to show a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse
action. If the employer is able to do so, the burden shifts back to
the employee to show the employer's nonretaliatory reason is
pretextual.3 ' This Note examines the first prong of the prima facie
case to determine if an employee's informal complaint is sufficient
to constitute an activity protected under the FLSA.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
33. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 ("Congress sought to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.").
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 206.
35. See id. § 207.
36. See Richmond v. Oneok, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1997).
37. See id. at 208 (citing Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Common examples of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are poor job performance, see
Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35,37-38 (1st Cir. 1999), violation of work rules, see
Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 323 (W.D. Va. 1999), and inability to
get along with coworkers, see Booze v. Shawmut Bank, Conn., 62 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (D.
Conn. 1999).
38. See Richmond, 120 F.3d at 208 (citingMorgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319,1323 (10th
Cir. 1997)). The employee may prove a proffered reason is pretextual by showing
"'weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's ... reasons for its action,' which'a reasonable factfinder could rationally find...
unworthy of credence.'" Id. at 209.
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TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 215(A)(3)
The controversy surrounding section 215(a)(3) ofthe FLSA centers
around the meaning of the phrase "has filed any complaint."39 The
divergent approaches taken in interpreting this phrase are illus-
trated in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital40 and Lambert v. Ackerley.41
The first approach, taken inLambert v. Genesee Hospital, construed
the statute narrowly and held the anti-retaliation provision to its
"plain language" by requiring that an employee file a formal written
complaint with a court or government agency, such as the DOL or
the EEOC, before invoking the protection of the FLSA.42 Conversely,
the Ninth Circuit rejected this reading of the provision in Lambert
v. Ackerley.4" Following the other circuit courts that had addressed
the issue," the court held informal complaints sufficient to invoke
the protection of the FLSA.45
39. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
40. 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993).
41. 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000).
42. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55; Booze, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Johns v. Cianbro
Corp., No. 3:98CV1831 (AHN), 1999 WL 200699, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 1999); Clevinger,
36 F. Supp. 2d at 324; O'Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (E.D. Va.
1997); Acosta v. Yale Club, No. 94 CIV. 0888 (KTD), 1995 WL 600873, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
12, 1995).
43. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.
44. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding written
complaints sufficient to fall within the statute); Cunningham v. Gibson County, Tenn., Nos.
95-6665, 95-6667, 1997 WL 123750, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) (-[I]t is the assertion of
statutory rights that is the triggering factor, not the filing of a formal complaint."); Conner
v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390,1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (protecting a plaintiffs assertion
that he was owed overtime wages); EEOC v. Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90
(6th Cir. 1992) (allowing protection of an employee who complained that her employer was
'breaking some sort of law'"); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding an employee's oral complaints sufficient to fall under the statute); Brock v.
Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987) (protecting an employee where the employer
was mistaken about the employee's participation in protected activity); Love v. RE/MAX of
Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the anti-retaliation provision where
the employee sent a memo to the employer and attached a copy of the EPA); Brennan v.
Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179,181 (8th Cir. 1975) (protecting an employee who refused
to return a back wage check).
45. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.
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Lambert v. Genesee Hospital
Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, the leading case supporting a narrow
construction of the provision, involved a charge of retaliation that
resulted from complaints alleging a violation of the EPA.46 The
plaintiffs prevailed at trial, but the Second Circuit reversed. The
court held that the plaintiff's informal complaints were not sufficient
to constitute protected activity.48
The court supported its conclusion by looking to the "plain lan-
guage" of the statute. The court argued that the plain language of
section 215(a)(3) limits its scope to retaliation for filing a formal
complaint with a court or government agency and does not protect
complaints made to employers.49 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on Judge Suhrheinrich's dissenting opinion in EEOC v.
Romeo Community Schools.50 Judge Suhrheinrich argued that the
section's prohibition of retaliation encompasses three enumerated
behaviors,"1 "[s]pecifically, those who have (1) filed [an FLSA] com-
plaint, (2) instituted an FLSA proceeding, or (3) testified in an FLSA
46. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 51. The plaintiffs worked in Genesee Hospital's
Duplicating Services Department. See id. at 50. In September of 1983, their supervisor, Tad
Timmel, announced that he planned to appoint a "charge person" to act as an informal
supervisor in the printing area. See id. at 51. Both Janine Lambert and a man in the
department, Francis Dupre, applied, and Dupre received the position and a corresponding
raise. See id. Eva Baker, who believed she supervised employees in the microfilm area,
complained to Timmel and Ron Good, of the Hospital's employee-affairs department, thather
position was substantially similar to Dupre's and that under the EPA, she was entitled to the
same salary as Dupre. See id.
Accompanying Baker, Lambert complained to Good that Timmel chose Dupre for the
"charge person" position because of Dupre's sex. See id. In September of 1984, Timmel
promoted Dupre to manage the department. See id. The plaintiffs complained to Paul
Hanson, the Hospital's president, that Timmel selected Dupre based on his sex. See id. In
April of 1985, two of the plaintiffs resigned and, in July 1986, the plaintiffs filed suit against
Gonesee Hospital alleging retaliation for their complaints to Timmel, Good and Hanson
regarding the denial of equal pay and sex discrimination. See id.
47. See id. at 51-52, 56.
48. See id. at 55.
49. See id.; Booze v. Shawmut Bank, Conn., 62 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (D. Conn. 1999);
Johns v. Cianbro Corp., No. 3:98CV1831 (AHN), 1999 WL 200699, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 29,
1999); Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999); O'Neill v.
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 663-64 (E.D. Va. 1997); Acosta v. Yale Club, No.
94 CIV. 0888 (KTD), 1995 WL 600873, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1995).
50. 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55.
51. See Romeo, 976 F.2d at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
326
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proceeding."52 This list comprises the entire scope -of com-plaints
sufficient to fall under the statute.5 3 The Genesee Hospital court
further argued that the statute's unambiguous language made
deference to the EEOC's interpretation that EPA retaliation should.
encompass informal complaints unnecessary.
5 4
Lambert v. Ackerley
The Ninth Circuit, in Lambert v. Ackerley, rejected these argu-
ments and held that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision does
encompass an employee's informal complaints made to an em-
ployer.55 In support of that determination, the court first looked to
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55 (citing Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), in which the Supreme Court stated, "[ilf
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"). But see EEOC
Compl. Man. supra note 13, § 8 at 8-3 n.12 (noting that "courts have recognized that the
statute prohibits retaliation based on opposition to allegedly unlawful practices").
55. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936
(2000). Ackerley involved six former ticket sales account executives (AEs) for the Seattle
SuperSonics (Sonics). See id. at 1001. The AEs' compensation plan provided $2,000 per year
in overtime wages, regardless of the number of overtime hours worked. See id. In 1993, the
Sonics reduced the AEs' work week and discontinued the overtime compensation. See id. In
fay of 1994, oneAE, Laura Lambert, requested a meetingwith the Sonics' Controller, Brian
Dixon, to discuss the Sonics' failure to pay the AEs for the actual overtime hours worked. See
id. Lambert also raised the issue with Bob Boustead, head of ticket sales, and contacted the
DOL to request information regarding overtime wages. See id. The DOL informed Lambert
that the Sonics' overtime scheme violated the FLSA. See id. Lambert then went to Dixon
with this information. See id. Dixon told Lambert that if she continued to demand overtime
she would "definitely nothave a job." Id. In June of 1994, Lambert hired an attorney who
contacted Barry Ackerley, CEO, requesting that the Sonics pay Lambert and the other AEs
for their overtime hours. See id. at 1001-02. The overtime claims were eventually settled. See
id. at 1002. In December 1994, however, nine of the ten AEs were discharged. See id. The
only AE not discharged was the one AE who never complained of a violation. See id.
The plaintiffs filed suit for retaliation in violation of section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA and
won ajury verdict. See id. The defendants moved for ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, for a new trial and a remittitur of damages. See id. The court remitted
the punitive damages, denied the remaining motions, and the defendants appealed. See id.
Relying on Genesee Hospital, a three-judge panel reversed on the ground that the anti-
retaliation provision does not apply to complaints made to an employer. See Lambert v.
Ackerley, 156 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs filed for a rehearing en banc, which
was granted, and the panel opinion was withdrawn. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 169 F.3d 666
(9th Cir. 1999). After rehearing, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. See Lambert
v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000).
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the purpose of the statute.56 It argued that the FLSA's remedial
purpose required a broad interpretation of the Act."
Congress intended the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA to
provide an incentive for employees to report their employer's wage
and hour violations.5" In support of that incentive, the anti-
retaliation provision was meant to ensure that employees do not risk
their jobs when asserting rights under the FLSA.59 Construing the
provision to require formal complaints to be filed with a court or
government agency would undermine this protection and discourage
employees from asserting their rights.6 °
The Ninth Circuit then looked to the language of the statute and
rejected the argument that the language of the provision was
unambiguous.61 In examining the phrase "has filed any complaint,"62
the court argued that the terms "any complaint" and "filed" encom-
passed those complaints made to an employer or supervisor. The
court further believed it reasonable to assume that when Congress
enacted the FLSA, it knew about grievance procedures, which
generally require an employee to complain to her employer before
beginning any other proceeding.6 It was therefore reasonable that
Congress intended section 215(a)(3) to include those complaints
made directly to employers.65 Construing the statute to include
informal complaints ensured that "'fear of economic retaliation'
56. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1003.
57. See id.; see also Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590,597 (1944) (arguing that the statute's remedial purpose mandated that the statute"must
not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner").
58. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
59.
To an employee considering an attempt to secure his just wage deserts under
the Act, the value of such an effort may pale when set against the prospect of
discharge and the total loss of wages for the indeterminate period necessary to
seek and obtain reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often
take on the character of a calculated risk .... Faced with such alternatives,
employees understandably might decide that matters had best be left as they
are.
Id. at 292-93.
60. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.
61. See id. at 1004-05.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 1004.
64. See id.; see also infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text (addressing grievance
procedures and the effect of a narrow construction of such policies).
65. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004.
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[would] not 'operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept
substandard conditions."'66 The court therefore concluded that it was
reasonable to read "has filed any complaint" to include informal
complaints made to employers.6
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
construction it gave the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision was in line
with the construction given to similar provisions in other federal
acts.6" The court compared the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision to
those in the Energy Reorganization Act,69 the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act,70 the Federal Railroad Safety Act71 and the Clean
Water Act.72 In construing the retaliation provisions in these acts,
other federal courts allowed informal complaints by employees to fall
within the acts' protection.73 The court concluded that an employee's
informal complaints were sufficient to receive protection under the
FLSA, but it declined to define the degree of formality with which
an employee must complain to receive protection.74
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 215(A)(3) AND AN ANALOGY TO
OTHER FEDERAL ACTS
The question of the degree of formality with which an employee
must complain to invoke the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA
currently splits the federal circuits.75 In defining the phrase "has
filed any complaint," the Second Circuit held employees to what it
66. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
67. See id- at 1005.
68. See id. at 1006.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1005 n.3.
70. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1006 & n.5.
71. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (repealed 1994); see Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1006 & n.7.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994); see Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1006-07 & n.8.
73. See infra notes 155-77 and accompanying text.
74. SeeAckerley, 180 F.3d at 1007 ("EN] ot all abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute
the filing of a conmplaint with one's employer.'" (quoting Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173
F.3d 35, 44 (st Cir. 1999))).
75. Compare Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004 (holding that the protection of the FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision extends to those employees who make informal complaints to their
employer), with Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the
plain language of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision precludes protection unless an
employee files a lawsuit or formal complaint with a government agency).
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termed the "plain language" of the statute and required employees
to file a formal written complaint with a government agency or
court.76 No other circuit court has taken this approach. The
remaining federal courts that have addressed the issue 8 have taken
a liberal approach, allowing informal complaints to fall within the
provision. 9 This section surveys the arguments on each side of the
debate and concludes that the statute should be read broadly to
protect employees who file informal complaints.
Competing Arguments Surrounding the Construction of the
FLSA's Anti-retaliation Provision
Language
To determine the proper construction of a statute, one must begin
with the language of the statute itself.80 Where the language of the
statute is ambiguous and the congressional intent regarding the
76. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55.
77. See Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1004; Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (lst
Cir. 1999); Cunningham v. Gibson County, Tenn., Nos. 95-6665, 95-6667, 1997 WL 123750,
at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir.
1997); EEOC v, Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v.
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984);
Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975). .There are, however,
district courts that have employed the reasoning of the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Clevinger
v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999) (holding that an employee
who complained orally to management and contacted the DOL failed to"file[ I] any complaint"
within the meaning of the statute); O'Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661,663-
64 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding an employee's oral complaints regarding the employer's failure
to provide overtime pay insufficient to fall within the protection of the statute).
78. The Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have not addressed the issue, however, lower
courts within these circuits have rendered opinions. See Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24
(holding an informal complaint insufficient to fall within the statute); Laird v. Chamber of
Commerce, No. CIV.A.97-2813, 1998 WL 240401, at *1 (E.D. La. May 12, 1998) (denying a
motion to dismiss where an employee had contacted the DOL); Wittenberg v. Wheels, Inc.,
963 F. Supp. 654, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision
includes informal complaints).
79. See cases cited supra note 21.
80. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 632 (9th Cir. 1988) ("As in all cases of
statutory interpretation, our starting point in determining Congress's intent must be the
language of the statute itself."). See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 227 (1999) (discussing various doctrines of statutory
interpretation).
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precise issue is not clear, courts must defer to the interpretation of
the agency charged with enforcing the statute, provided that the
agency has adopted a reasonable interpretation."1
Formal Complaints Required
Those who support a narrow reading of the anti-retaliation
provision82 take a textualist approach," arguing that the language
of the section limits protection to employees who file formal
complaints." The narrow reading begins with the basic precept that
"[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court... must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress."8
5
In the case of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, narrow
constructionists argue that the language provision is patently un-
ambiguous.8 " The plain language protects employees who engage
in three types of conduct: "[sipecifically, those who have (1) filed [an
FLSAI complaint, (2) instituted an FLSA proceeding, or (3) testified
in an FLSAproceeding."7 Construing the words in context, a number
of courts have concluded that this statutory language only protects
conduct that is formal in nature. 8 For example, in Clevinger the
court held that the term "filed" mandated a written procedure and
81. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46,55 (2d Cir. 1993); Booze v. Shawmut
Bank, Conn., 62 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (D. Conn. 1999); Johns v. Cianbro Corp., No.
3:98CV1831 (AHN), 1999 WL 200699, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 1999); Clevinger, 36 F. Supp.
2d at 324; O'Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 663-64; Acostav. Yale Club, No. 94 CIV. 0888 (KTD), 1995
WL 600873, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1995).
83. See generally Strauss, supra note 80, at 227 (defining "textualists" as those who"agree
that statutory meaning is to be found in the words the legislature has used-read with
sensitivity and attention to context, perhaps, but most importantly read for textual meaning
uninstructed by political history or other like considerations").
84. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55; Booze, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Cianbro, 1999 WL
200699, at*2; Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 324; O'Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 663-64; Acosta, 1995
WL 600873, at *4.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
86. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55; Booze, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Cianbro, 1999 WL
200699, at *2; Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 324; O'Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 663-64;Acosta, 1995'
WL 600873, at *4.
87. EEOC v. Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (1992) (Suhrheinrich, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
88. See, e.g., Clevinger, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
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that the statute did not encompass oral complaints.8 9 Courts must
apply the statute as written, unless doing so would violate Congress's
clear intent. ° As courts that favor a narrow construction argue,
a reading that includes only formal complaints is consistent with
Congress's intent, as evidenced in the plain language of the
provision. 1 Accordingly, the argument goes, the provision must be
limited to formal complaints.
Informal Complaints Permitted
In contrast, those supporting a broad construction of the FLSA
contend that "has filed any complaint"92 should be construed to
include informal complaints.9 They argue that the phrase is
ambiguous because it is susceptible to many different inter-
pretations. 4 The fact that the statute does not define the words
"filed" and "complaint" compounds the provision's ambiguity.95
Reading "has filed any complaint" to apply strictly to lawsuits or
complaints to a government agency would cause the phrase "or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related
to this chapter"96 to be meaningless because when an employee files
a lawsuit or complaint with a government agency, the employee
89. See id.
90. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997).
91. See Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d at 55.
92. For the relevant text of section 215(a)(3), see supra note 14.
93. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
936 (2000); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999); Cunningham v.
Gibson County, Tenn., Nos. 95-6665, 95-6667, 1997 WL 123750, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18,
1997); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Romeo
Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881
F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brockv. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987); Love
v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha,
Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
94. See, e.g., Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41. Cf Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146
F.3d 12, 19 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that the phrase "has filed a complaint" in the
Safety Transportation Assistance Act is ambiguous because "the language does not saywhere
a complaint must be filed").
95. Cf Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The
meaning of the provision is rendered unclear inasmuch as the statute does not include
definitions of the pertinent terms.").
96. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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causes the court or agency to begin a proceeding." When courts
interpret statutes, they may"assume that Congress used two terms
because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous
meaning.""8
Furthermore, under the broad construction view, the congressional
intent is not clear. The language of the statute does not indicate
whether Congress intended to exclude informal complaints.99
Congress did not mandate that the complaint be filed with a court
or government agency and its use of the word "any" creates the
possibility that Congress intended the provision to apply to informal
complaints. 100
If a statutory provision is ambiguous, a court would usually defer
to the interpretation of the agency responsible for enforcing the
Act.10 1 Neither the DOL nor the EEOC, however, have issued
guidelines regarding the proper construction of the statute.1 2 As
such, a court may look beyond the strict language of the statute to
determine if the interpretation is "based on a permissible-construc-
tion" of the provision.0 '
Although the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision
presents a strong argument for limiting the provision to formal
complaints,0 4 in the final analysis, the language is simply not clear
enough. The provision is not so unambiguous that a construction
permitting informal complaints would run contrary to Congress's
clear intent. The lack of definitions of pertinent terms and ex-
plicit instructions regarding filing complaints make the provision
97. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42; Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-1542-AS,
1997 WL 907915, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997) ("[I]f the term 'filed any complaint' means a
'lawsuit,' then it would be redundant with the words 'or ... instituted any proceeding' in that
same sentence. The court will not assume that Congress inserted these words for no purpose
at all.").
98. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995).
99. Cf Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary ofLabor, 50 F.3d 926,932 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the Energy Reorganization Act "does not directly address whether internal complaints
are protected activity").
100. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41.
101. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
102. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42 n.5.
103. Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 932 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
104. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (arguing that the plain language of the
provision requires formal complaints).
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vulnerable to conflicting interpretations.1 5 As the phrase "cause
to be instituted any proceeding"' 6 would be rendered meaningless
by a narrow construction, 107 the stronger arguments lie in favor of
including informal complaints within the provision.
Purpose of the Act
Formal Complaints Required
As a remedial statute, the FLSA should not ordinarily be
construed in a "narrow, grudging manner."0' Those supporting the
inclusion of only formal complaints within section 215(a)(3) could
argue, however, that the remedial nature of the statute does not
mandate an interpretation that retreats from Congress's obvious
intent, which is shown in the plain language of the Act.0 9
The FLSA's main goal was to protect employees from poor labor
standards, not solely from retaliation, and, therefore, the provision
affords narrower protection than similar provisions in general
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII. ° Employees do not
receive general protection through the provision."' Although the
FLSA does not directly address the proper means of reporting
violations, the appropriate channels are implicit in section
215(a)(3).1 2 The protection extends to those who have "filed any
complaint.""' This language implies that the appropriate channels
are formal channels."'
105. Cf Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 19 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the phrase "has filed a complaint" is ambiguous due to the lack of
instructions as to filing); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir.
1985) (stating that the absence of definitions rendered the anti-retaliation provision
unclear).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
107. Cf Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-1542-AS, 1997 WL 907915, at *1
(D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997) (noting that the phrase "filed any complaint" cannot mean lawsuit as
such a construction would make the phrase "instituted a proceeding" meaningless).
108. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,321 U.S. 590,597 (1944).
109. See HERMAN A. WECHT, WAGE-HOUR LAW: COVERAGE 29 (1951).
110. See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 233-34 (1992).
111. See id. at 234.
112. See id. (discussing the way the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and other
federal statutes generally structure retaliation provisions).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
114. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 110, at 235.
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This formal construction is supported by the original procedures
outlined in the Act. Initially, all suits had to be brought by the
Secretary of Labor, thus requiring employees to make complaints
to the DOL." 5 Congress intended the provision to encompass only
those employees who asserted their rights by using the tools
Congress had prescribed." 6 As such, the argument concludes the
Act's purpose and goals are served by requiring employees to file
formal complaints.
Informal Complaints Permitted
The FLSA is a remedial statute and part of a large body of
humanitarian legislation that was enacted during the Great
Depression. 7 Those supporting a broad construction argue that
the provision was designed to encourage employees to report
violations and should be interpreted in light of the fact that
employees may choose not to report violations if they fear
retaliation."' "A narrow construction of the anti-retaliation pro-
vision could create an atmosphere of intimidation and defeat the
Act's purpose in § 215(a)(3) of preventing employees' attempts to
secure their rights under the Act from taking on the character of'a
calculated risk." 9
Allowing employees to pursue informal internal remedies benefits
both the employee and the employer. ° A construction of the statute
requiring an employee to file a formal external complaint denies
the employer an opportunity to resolve the situation quietly and
115. See LES A. SCHNEMER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE & HouR LAw. COMPLIANCE &
PRACTICE § 12:01 (1995).
116. Cf Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating the
purpose of the participation clause of Title VII as "protect[ing the employee who utilizes the
tools provided by Congress").
117. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944).
118. See Brockv. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121,124 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Mitchellv. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,292 (1960) ("[F]ear of economic retaliation might often
operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.").
119. Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (lst Cir. 1999) (citing Mitchell, 361
U.S. at 293).
120. See Passaic Valley Sewerage Cornm'rs v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
478-79 (3d Cir. 1993).
2000] 335
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
promptly. ' This is particularly important where the situation is the
product of a misunderstanding.'22 A more rigid construction would
discourage prior discussion. 12 3 Permitting the employee to approach
the employer without fear of retaliation would allow the misunder-
standing to be resolved before involving a court or government
agency. 2 4 Conversely, construing the statute to require formal
complaints gives the employer the incentive to fire the employee at
the first sign that the employee believes there has been aviolation.'
This is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that most
employees who file external complaints also make internal ones.
2 6
Ultimately, the remedial purpose of the provision weighs heavily
in favor of protecting informal complaints. A narrow reading would
stifle the remedial nature of the Act as fear of retaliation might cause
employees to choose silence over unemployment.'27 Such a choice
is precisely what Congress sought to prevent by including the
provision. 128 It seems counterintuitive that a provision meant to
protect employees from retaliation would only encompass a very
select few. Accordingly, a broad reading of the provision must be
employed if the purposes of the Act are to be promoted.
Grievance Procedures
Formal Complaints Required
From one perspective, employer abuse of the internal grievance
process supports a narrow construction requiring employees to use
formal external channels. A supervisor, after hearing an employee's
legitimate complaint, may discourage the employee from pursuing
a claim by telling the employee the claim is frivolous or unfounded.'29
121. See Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc., v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998).
122. See Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 479.
123. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43.
124. See Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 479.
125. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43; Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59
(N.D. Ga. 1985).
126. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 110, at 26.
127. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
128. See id. at 293.
129. See generally Peter M. Panken & Stacey B. Babson, Creating the Personnel Paper
Trail: Personnel Manuals and Grievance Procedures, SB36 ALI-ABA *1, *45 (1997) (stating
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A construction of the provision that requires employees to file a
complaint with the DOL or court may avoid this abuse because
external complaints engage the assistance of unbiased individuals
to review-the merits of the claim."' Further, as retaliation is often
extremely subtle, there is no way for an internal grievance procedure
to effectively protect all employees from retaliation.131 Accordingly,
as the argument goes, a formal construction of the provision actually
provides an employee more protection through an external inves-
tigation.
Informal Complaints Permitted
Those supporting protection of informal complaints by the FLSA
argue that a narrow construction would render grievance procedures
whollyineffective. "2 Grievance procedures allow employees a forum
to voice their concerns. 33 Companies adopt such procedures as a
structured means of resolving conflict between the company and the
employee." The first step in grievance procedures is generally an
informal complaint to an employee's direct supervisor. 3 5 The second
step involves a formal written complaint to higher-level manage-
ment.3 6 The final step involves a formal complaint to a personnel
director, vice president or president.3 7 Protection of employees who
participate in grievance procedures is important because grievance
that the people receiving the complaints must be fully trained before a grievance procedure
can be effective).
130. An external complaint to a government agency would begin an investigation into the
employer's actions by that agency. A meritless suit could, therefore, be dismissed rather
quickly. Furthermore, an employee who intends to file a lawsuit will go to an attorney who
will assess the claim. If the claim is wholly without merit, the attorney will advise the
employee as such and the employee likely will not continue with the suit. This is true
because all attorneys are bound by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
forbids attorneys from filing frivolous litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). See generally
Samuel J. Levine, Seeking a Common Language for the Application of Rule 11 Sanctions:
What is 'Frivolous"?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 677 (1999) (discussing the meaning of frivolous under
Rule 11).
131. See DAVMW. EWING, JUSTICE ONTHE JOB: RESOLVING GRiEVANCES INITHE NONUNION
WORKPLACE 96 (1989).
132. See generally Valerio, 173 F.3d at 35.
133. See Panken & Babson, supra note 129, at *43.
134. See id at *42.
135. See id. at *48-50.
136. See icl. at *50-52.
137. See id. at *52.
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procedures have the potential to reduce the amount of litigation filed
in an already overcrowded federal judiciary. 138
A construction that requires an employee to file a lawsuit or
formal charge with a government agency would not protect an
employee who participated in any level of a grievance procedure. 3 9
An employee's informal complaint to a supervisor must receive
protection under the FLSA; otherwise, employees have no incentive
to use a grievance procedure and employers would have an incentive
to fire those employees who did.'
Although some employers may attempt to abuse internal grievance
procedures, the number doing so is undoubtedly small. Grievance
procedures are extremely important to employers, as well as
employees. These procedures enable employers to resolve disputes
quickly, quietly, and efficiently." As such, employees should be
encouraged to use grievance procedures. A reading of the anti-
retaliation provision that includes informal complaints is consistent
with the importance of grievance procedures and therefore more
appropriate because it protects those employees that a narrow
reading excludes. 42
Cost
Formal Complaint Required
Those supporting a formal construction of the Act might also argue
that providing protection to those employees who make informal
complaints would increase the number of retaliation lawsuits filed,
thus increasing the amount of money employers need to devote to
138. See generally Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., Arbitration of Employment Claims, 591
PLI/Lit *811, *871 (1998) (discussing the overcrowded federal courts and the contribution of
employment discrimination suits to this problem).
139. Under the Second Circuit's construction of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, an
employer could fire an employee after the employee complained to her supervisor, the first
step of the grievance procedure. The employee would thus be punished for following the
employer's policy regarding complaints of statutory violations.
140. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999).
141. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
142. Under a narrow construction of the provision, an employer could fire an employee
after the employee took the first step inthe grievance procedure, discussing the problem with
her supervisor. An employee should not be punished for following her employer's policy
regarding grievances.
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defending the claims.' The expense of litigation makes employers
more likely to settle these suits, regardless of the merits of the
case.'" A construction requiring employees to file charges with a
government agency or court reduces the cost to employers because
the government agency would dismiss the frivolous suits and the
expense of a lawsuit would deter employees whose claims were not
valid.
Informal Complaint Permitted
According to those favoring a broad construction, including
informal complaints within the language of section 215(a)(3) is more
economical than a strict construction of the Act because it does not
require the employee to involve a court or government agency. 146
Responding to a charge of retaliation costs an employer thousands
of dollars in attorney's fees. 46 If the charge is not settled at the
agency level and leads to a lawsuit, the attorneys' fees rise to more
than $50,000, regardless of the merits of the case.1 47 Requiring an
employee to file with a court or government agency does not allow
an employer to resolve claims quickly and often causes employers
to settle frivolous suits in order to avoid the costs of litigation or
defending against an agency investigation."48 Allowing internal
complaints saves employers the cost of litigation as well as other
potential costs, such as personal liability, loss of productivity and
negative publicity. 49 It also allows an employer to correct the
143. Cf David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing aNew Sink in the
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 76-78 (1999) (arguing that the increase in protected
classes for discrimination has increased the number of lawsuits filed).
144. See id. at 81.
145. Cf Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
478-79 (stating with regard to the Clean Water Act that "it is most appropriate, both in terms
of efficiency and economics... that employees notify management of their observations as
to the corporation's failures before formal investigations and litigation are initiated").
146. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 143, at 81 (citing telephone interview with David
Ritter, chair of the Labor and Employment Department atAltheimer & Grey in Chicago, Ill.,
and Peter Albrecht, partner at Godfrey & Kahn in Madison, Wis. (Mar. 12, 1998)).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Stefan Riitzel, Snitching for the Common Good;- In Search of a Response to the
Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL L. & TECH. J. 1,
33 (1995); Sherwyn et al., supra note 143, at 81.
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situation before involving an agency, which saves money by avoiding
agency-imposed fines. 50
The argument that a broad construction of the provision would
create a greater number of protected employees, which in turn would
create a larger amount of litigation, appears persuasive at first
glance. 5 When examined in light of the alternative, however, it is
clear that a broad construction is more economical. 5 2 Defending
against lawsuits and agency investigations is extremely costly. 153
Allowing protection to employees' informal complaints promotes
internal discussion and, as such, reduces the costs associated with
lengthy lawsuits and government inquiries.1" Accordingly, the more
cost-effective construction of the anti-retaliation provision includes
informal complaints.
Drawing Guidance from Similar Provisions in Other Federal Acts
Anti-retaliation provisions like Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA are
common in federal statutes. The construction of similar provisions
in other federal acts provide helpful analogies and support the
inclusion of informal complaints within the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision.'55
National Labor Relations Act
In National Labor Relations Board v. Scrivener,'56 the Supreme
Court considered section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations
150. See Ritzel, supra note 149, at 33.
151. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (arguing that a broad construction
of the Act would provide a larger protected class, thus increasing the number of employees
with retaliation claims, thereby creating more litigation).
152. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text (arguing that a broad construction
is more economical because it encourages employees to discuss and resolve problems with
their employers without involving a government agency or court).
153. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 143, at 81.
154. See Riitzel, supra note 149, at 33; Sherwyn et al., supra note 143, at 81.
155. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on the
decisions of other federal courts regarding similar anti-retaliation provisions to support a
broad construction of section 215(a)(3)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000).
156. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
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Act (NLRA).'57 The Court held that the anti-retaliation provision
protected an employee who made a sworn written statement.5 8 In
so concluding, the Court relied on the NLRA's remedial purpose and
focused on the objective of section 8(a)(4), which the Court argued
was to allow employees freedom in making complaints.159 Although
noting that the language of the statute could be construed narrowly,
the Court stated that, "[oin textual analysis alone, the presence of
the.., words 'to discharge or otherwise discriminate' reveals.., an
intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow
protection to the employee."160 Arguing that it would not make sense
to protect an employee who filed a formal charge but not one who
participated in the development of the charge, the Court concluded
that the statute must be approached and construed liberally.161
Scrivener is particularly helpful in analyzing section 215(a)(3)
because courts often use the NLRA as a guideline for FLSA coverage
and decisions regarding the NLRA are persuasive with regard to the
FLSA.16
2
Energy Reorganization Act
In Bechtel Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor,163 the Eleventh
Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision of the Energy
Reorganization Act' (ERA) applied to informal complaints made
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994 & Supp. 111997). Section 8(a)(4) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter." Id. §
158(a)(4).
158. See Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121..
159. See id. at 121-22.
160. Id. at 122.
161. See id. at 124.
162. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947) ("The Fair Labor
Standards Act... is a part of the social legislation of the 1930s of the same general character
as the National Labor Relations Act.... Decisions that define the coverage [of a provision
in the NLRA] are persuasive in the consideration of a similar [provision] under the [FLSA].").
163. 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 1995).
164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-51 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The anti-retaliation provision is set
forth in section 5851(a). Bechtel addresses the construction of the provision before its 1992
amendment, which explicitly provides protection to employees who make internal
complaints. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(A),(B).
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to supervisors. 165 The court primarily relied on the legislative history
of the ERA, which suggested that Congress knew courts had
construed similar provisions to include informal complaints when
it compared the ERA's provision to those in other acts.166 InAckerley,
the Ninth Circuit accepted this construction, comparing the ERA to
the FLSA and stating that both acts contemplate a "broad remedial
purpose" and a need to "be free from the threat of retaliatory
discharge'" if they are to "'function effectively.'"'167
Mine Safety Act
The D.C. Circuit, in Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations
Appeals,16 held that section 110(b)(1) of the Mine Safety Act 169
protects a miner who informs his supervisor of the employer's safety
violations.7 0 The court argued that such a reading of the statute was
necessary to effectuate the broad purpose of the Act.' Congress
sought "to encourage the reporting of suspected violations of health
and safety regulations" because "miners will not speak up if they fear
retaliation."' Congress intended that employees receive the same
protection under the Mine Safety Act as they would from other
federal statutes, including the FLSA 73
165. See Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 932.
166. See id.; S. REP. No. 95-848, at 29 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7303, 7303-
04.
167. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting MacKowiak v.
University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984)).
168. 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
169. 30 U.S.C. §§ 811-25 (1994). Prior to being amended in 1977, section 110(b)(1)
prohibited discrimination against a miner because the miner:
(A) has notified the Secretary or his authorized representative of an alleged violation
or danger, (B) has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding
under this chapter, or (C) has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting
from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.
Id. § 820(b)(1).
170. See Phillips, 500 F.2d at 778.
171. See id. at 782.
172. 115 CONG. REC. 27948 (1969).
173. See id. (stating that the anti-retaliation provision "puts into the Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act the same protection which we find in other legislation" and specifically
naming the FLSA among the other legislation).
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Clean Water Act
In Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. Department of
Labor,174 the Third Circuit found "the facial language of the Clean
Water Act's whistle-blower protection provision to admit of more
than one interpretation" and held that the provision extended to
informal complaints.17 The court argued that employees must be
free from fear of retaliation before they will report statutory
violations. 7 ' Construing the statute to include informal complaints
was necessary, the court concluded, because the provision "would
be largely hollow if it were restricted to the point of filing a formal
complaint with the appropriate external law enforcement agency."
77
Title VII
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964178 (Title
VII) protects employees who oppose discrimination or participate in
the statutory complaint process. 79 The "opposition clause" of Title
VII encompasses any method of complaint, formal or informal, that
could reasonably be interpreted by the employer as opposition to
discrimination."' 0
The Second Circuit refused to apply this type of broad construction
to the FLSA in Genesee Hospital.' The court argued that the broad
174. 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993).
175. Id. at 478. Section 507(a) of the Clean Water Act provides:
No person shall fire, or in any other way discriminate against,.., any employee
... by reason of the fact that such employee... has filed, instituted, or caused
to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter, or has testified or is
about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or
enforcement of the [Clean Water Act].
33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
176. See Passiac Valley, 992 F.2d at 478.
177. Id.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
179. See icd. This section states that:
[it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees... because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
180. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 13, at § 8.
181. See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993).
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language of Title VII mandated a narrow reading of the FLSA.'82
Although the FLSA does not include an explicit "opposition clause,"
the language of the provision is broad enough to include informal
complaints.1
3
The Fair Pay Act of 1999
The Fair Pay Act of 1999,184 a bill introduced to the Senate in
March of 1999, also supports a broad construction of the FLSA. The
bill seeks to amend section 6 of the FLSA to prohibit paying one
employee less than another based on the employee's sex, race, or
national origin.' In order to further the purpose of this addition,
Congress proposed an amendment to section 15.186 This amendment
would add an "opposition clause" that would apply to the amended
portion of section 6."87 If the Second Circuit's narrow reading of the
statute were accepted, the proposed amendment to the FLSA would
create a bizarre situation. An employee who made an informal
complaint regarding section 6(h) would be protected, whereas an
employee who complained informally about a violation of any other
section would not be protected by the Act. This is particularly
troublesome in light of the fact that the proposed amendment merely
extends the EPA's concept of equal pay for equal work to race and
national origin.' Therefore, this Note proposes a construction of the
FLSA that mirrors that given to Title VII.
The anti-retaliation provision should be read to include informal
complaints made by employees to their supervisors or employer, as
this construction is supported by the language and purpose of the
182. See id. at 55.
183. See McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486-87 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996) ("While
the FLSA contains no similar 'opposition' clause... the language of§ 215(a)(3) is sufficiently
broad to encompass conduct taken on behalf of others.").
184. S. 702, 106th Cong. (1999).
185. See id. § 3.
186. See id. § 4.
187. See id. § 4 (amending section 215(a)(3) by adding paragraph 6, which makes it
unlawful "to discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any
act or practice made unlawful by section 6(h) or because such individual made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
to enforce section 6(h)").
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); S. 702, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999) (amending 29 U.S.C. §
206).
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statute. It is more cost effective, allows employers to resolve conflict
in accordance with internal policies and is consistent with the
construction given analogous provisions in other federal acts.
Accordingly, a broad construction of the provision is appropriate and
necessary.
Proper Construction
Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA should, in light of the discussion
above, be read to include informal complaints. Having reached such
a conclusion, one issue remains-mamely, with what degree of
formality must an employee complain in order to preserve a later
charge of retaliation against the employer?18 9 This Note argues that
the construction given the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision should
be similar to that given the retaliation provision in Title VII. 90 This
construction would include various degrees of informal complaints,
while providing the employer a reasonable expectation of when
statutory rights are being invoked. 9
Admittedly, "[t]here is a point at which an employee's concerns
and comments are too generalized and informal to constitute
'complaints' that are 'filed' with an employer within the meaning of
the [FLSA. "'192 The court in Ackerley stated that "so long as an
employee communicates the substance of his allegations to the
employer ... he is protected by § 215(a)(3).... [Tihe employee may
communicate such allegations orally or in writing, and need not refer
189. See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that it was
not necessary to "describe the minimum specificity with which an employee must assert an
alleged FLSA violation in order to find protection under § 215(a)(3)"), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 936 (2000); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) ("We conclude
S.. that we have little choice but to proceed on a case-by-case basis. .. ").
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). For the text ofTitle VII's retaliation provision, see
supra note 179. The language in Title VII allows protection to any employee who "opposes"
discrimination. This phrase has been interpreted to include any protest that "would
reasonably have been interpreted as opposition to employment discrimination." EEOC
Compl. Man. supra note 13, § 8, at 8-5.
191. See EEOC Compl. Man. supra note 13, § 8, at 8-3 to 8-4 (allowing protection for
retaliation to an employee who opposes discrimination).
192. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 44 (quoting Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146
F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 1998)).
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to the statute by name."193 A protest that could reasonably be
interpreted by the employer as an assertion of statutory rights,
however, is consistent with the congressional intent and the goals
of the FLSA.'94
Types of Complaints Courts Have Given Protection
In addressing this issue, courts have held varying degrees of
informality sufficient to bring an employee within the anti-
retaliation provision.'95 The holdings can be divided into four
different categories: an employee's refusal to give up her statutory
rights,'96 written complaints, 9 7 contact with the DOL, 9 ' and oral
complaints. 99 The first, refusal to give up rights, enjoys near
universal acceptance, while the remaining three have been at the
center of the controversy surrounding this provision.
Refusal to Give Up Rights
An employee's refusal to give up her rights generally involves the
filing of a formal complaint and disclosure of statutory violations
193. Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1008 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985,
989 (6th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis omitted).
194. This standard is applied to retaliation cases under Title VII and is used by the EEOC
for cases involving the EPA. Arguably, the language of the FLSA is broad enough to
encompass this interpretation. See discussion supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text; see
also EEOC Compl. Man. supra note 13, § 8, (1998) (applying such a standard to the EPA).
195. See cases cited supra note 21.
196. See Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 879 (3d Cir. 1987); Brennan v.
Maxey's Yamaha, Inc. 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975).
197. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 45; Cunninghamv. Gibson County, Tenn., Nos. 95-6665,95-
6667, 1997 WL 123750, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997); Love v. REfMAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d
383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984).
198. See Morgan v. Future Ford Sales, 830 F. Supp. 807, 810 (D. Del. 1993); Prewitt v.
Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 560, 563-64 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
199. See Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Romeo
Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881
F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Wittenberg v. Wheels, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 654, 659-60 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-1542-AS, 1997 WL 907915, at *3
(D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997); Stading v. DFC Transp. Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. 92C 1807, 1993 WL
338987, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1993); LeFebure v. Rite-A-Way Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-
1435 MLB, 1993 WL245747, at *4 (D. Kan. June 14, 1993); Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta,
Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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resulting from a DOL investigation."' The DOL then orders the
employer to provide back pay and the employer subsequently orders
the employee to return the back pay awards.2"' When the employee
refuses to do so and is terminated, courts permit the employee to
invoke the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.0 2
The Second Circuit, in Genesee Hospital, distinguished this type
of case from those involving informal complaints on the basis that
it "grew out of the filing of [formal] claims."203 Such a situation,
however, is not as easily distinguishable as the Second Circuit
argues. When an employee refuses to return back pay, she is
informally protesting the employer's violation of the FLSA. The same
is true when an employee protests an employer's failure to pay
minimum wage, overtime, or equal pay for equal work. In these
situations, the employee is "complaining" about a violation of the
FLSA.0 4 "Construing the anti-retaliation provision to exclude from
its protection all those employees who seek to obtain fair treat-
ment.., would leave employees completely unprotected.., when
they complain to their employers about violations of the Act-exactly
what the anti-retaliation provision was designed to prevent."
205
Written Complaints
The second category involves written complaints to employers.
Courts have allowed written complaints directed at individuals,
ranging from an employee's direct supervisor to the president of
the company, to afford the employee protection under Section
200. See Brennan, 513 F.2d at 180.
201. See id.
202. See Brockv. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872,879 (2d Cir. 1988); Brennan, 513
F.2d at 183.
203. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1993).
204. In Genesee Hospital, the Second* Circuit stated that "[pirotection against
discrimination for instituting FLSA proceedings would be worthless if an employee could be
fired for declining to give up the benefits he is due under the Act.'" Id. at 55 (quoting Brock,
839 F.2d at 879). Arguably, this language could apply to an informal complaint because in
alleging that his rights are being violated, an employee is "declining to give up the benefits
he is due under the Act." Id.
205. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936
(2000).
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215(a)(3). °6 Although in at least one instance the employee quoted
relevant statutory language,20 7 such action is not required to hold
a written complaint sufficient under the statute.0 8 Limiting the anti-
retaliation provision to written complaints, however, does not resolve
all problems with interpretation. 20 9 For example, has the employee
filed a complaint within the meaning of the statute if the employee
calls the DOL to complain about an employer's violation? 
2 10
Contact with the Department of Labor
Often an employee contacts the DOL to obtain information
regarding a particular employment practice before going to the
employer and alleging a violation.21' Courts have granted protection
to employees who contacted the DOL, regardless of whether the
employee filed a formal complaint.212 Congress intended employees
to police employers by reporting violations, which requires infor-
mation regarding the applicable law.21 ' Such a goal requires that
inquiries to the DOL be protected from retaliation. 1 4
Oral Complaints
Finally, many courts have held that an oral complaint alone
constitutes protected activity within the meaning of section
215(a)(3).215 Courts have not required that the employee mention the
206. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Cunningham v.
Gibson County, Tenn., Nos. 95-6665,95-6667,1997WL 123750(6th Cir. Mar. 18,1997); Love
v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984).
207. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 38.
208. See id.; Cunningham, 1997 WL 123750, at *2.
209. See Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-1542-AS, 1997 WL 907915, at
*2 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997).
210. See id.
211. See Laird v. Chamber of Commerce, No.CIV. A.97-2813,1998 WL 240401, at *1 (E.D.
La. May 12, 1998); Morgan v. Future Ford Sales, 830 F. Supp. 807, 810 (D. Del. 1993);
Prewitt v. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 560 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
212. See Laird, 1998 WL 240401, at *1; Prewitt, 747 F. Supp. at 563-64.
213. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
214. See Morgan, 830 F. Supp. at 812-13.
215. See Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997); EEOC v.
Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985,989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOCv. White & Son Enters.,
881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Wittenberg v. Wheels, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 654, 659-60
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Lundervold v. Core-Mark Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-1542-AS, 1997 WL 907915,
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FLSA or EPA when making a complaint.216 The complaints have
been made to individuals including supervisors, human resource
personnel and owners of the company217 and have ranged from
detailed expressions of specific statutory violations to somewhat
broad and ambiguous assertions."' Although one court has held that
an employee's advice to coworkers constitutes protected activity,21 9
employees have not been entitled to protection where the employee's
position is not adverse to the company.22 The protection of informal
oral complaints made to employers is in accord with the goals
and purpose of the FLSA.22' Accordingly, the statute should be
construed to include informal complaints, whether written, oral, or
mere inquiries to the DOL.
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to fall within
the protection of the FLSA, a court should consider whether the
employee implicitly or explicitly communicated to the employer a
belief that the statute was beingviolated.222 If the complaint is broad
or ambiguous, the court must determine whether the complaint
would reasonably have been interpreted by the employer as an
assertion of rights.223
In order to engage in protected activity under § 215(a)(3), the
employee must ... either file (or threaten to file) an action
adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in
asserting FLSA rights, or otherwise engage in activities that
reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion
of rights protected by the FLSA.224
at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 1997); LeFebvre v. Rite-A-Way Indus., Inc., Civ. A. NQ. 91-1435-MLB,
1993 WL 245747, at *4 (D. Kan. June 14, 1993); Stading v. DFC Transp. Sys. Int'l, Inc., No.
92 C 1801, 1993 WL 338987, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1993); Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta,
Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 63 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
216. See Romeo, 976 F.2d at 989-90; White & Son, 881 F.2d at 1011; Wittenberg, 963 F.
Supp. at 657; Stading, 1993 WL 338987, at *4.
217. See White & Son, 881 F.2d at 1011; LeFebvre, 1993 WL 245747, at *4.
218. See Conner, 121 F.3d at 1394; Romeo, 976 F.2d at 989-90.
219. See Morgan, 830 F. Supp. at 815.
220. See McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1996).
221. See White & Son, 881 F.2d at 1011; supra notes 56-67, 107-28 and accompanying
text.
222. See EEOC Compl. Man. supra note 13, § 8, at 8-4.
223. See id. at 8-5.
224. McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486-87 (footnote omitted).
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Such a construction is consistent with the purpose and goals of
the FLSA 225 as well as the construction given similar provisions
in other federal acts.226
CONCLUSION
The competing arguments surrounding the construction of the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision favor a broad construction. The
language of the provision is ambiguous and broad enough to en-
compass informal complaints. The FLSA's purpose is furthered by
this construction. Protecting informal complaints ensures employees
will not be penalized for their participation in grievance procedures
and provides a cost-effective means for resolving conflict. The
conclusion that informal complaints should be protected under the
FLSA is supported by the constructions courts have given similar
provisions in other federal acts.
This Note proposes a construction of the FLSA that is similar
to that given to Title VII. Any protest that the employer could
reasonably interpret as an assertion of statutory rights is within the
contemplation of the FLSA. As this reading supports the goals of the
FLSA, the provision should include such complaints.,
Jennifer Lynne Redmond
225. See supra notes 56-67, 117-28 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 156-88 and accompanying text.
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